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Testimony

Before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
10:00 a.m., EDT
Tuesday,
September 19, 2000

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Lack of Haitian
Commitment Limited
Success of U.S. Aid to
Justice System

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary results of our review of U.S. assistance provided to Haiti's justice system.

In September 1994, the United States and other countries intervened militarily in Haiti to restore the democratically elected government that had been overthrown by the Haitian military in September 1991. Before this intervention, the Haitian military controlled the police and the judicial sector. Military and political cronyism dominated these institutions, and the military influenced the appointments of magistrates and the decisions made by them. These justice institutions were widely regarded as ineffective and corrupt.

After the intervention, the United States stepped in to provide assistance to the Haitian justice system -- both the police and the judicial sector -- aimed at developing a professional civilian police force, enhancing the effectiveness of existing judicial organizations, and improving the Haitian people's access to justice. This assistance also aimed at supporting a broader reform of the judicial sector that the Haitian government intended to pursue over time. The objectives of this assistance program were consistent with U.S. justice assistance objectives in other countries in Latin America.¹

As you know, U.S. assistance to the judicial sector was suspended in July 2000, because the United States was not able to negotiate an agreement with the Haitian government for continuing these assistance efforts. As of September 2000, most of the U.S. assistance to the Haitian police has stopped, due to congressional concerns related to events surrounding the May 2000 Haitian parliamentary and local elections. The U.S. Department of State is currently reassessing several aspects of the U.S. relationship with Haiti, based on concerns about how votes were counted in Haiti's May 2000 parliamentary and local elections.

My statement today is based on work we are currently concluding for your committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. First, I will discuss the results of the U.S. assistance provided to the Haitian police and judicial sector and the major problems that continue to affect these justice institutions. Second, I will discuss the primary factors that have affected the success of the assistance.

Our work is based on meetings with officials of the U.S. Departments of State and Justice, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Coast Guard, and other U.S. agencies. To examine the results of assistance provided, in June 2000, we went to Haiti, where we met with officials of the Haitian government, other donor countries (Canada and France), the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and

¹ See Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-98 (GAO/NSIAD-99-158, June 30, 1999); Foreign Assistance: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance to Five Latin American Countries (GAO/NSIAD-99-195, Aug. 4, 1999); and Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule of Law Program Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-00-8R, Oct. 13, 1999).

U.S. contractors. We also performed an extensive review of program documents. We expect to issue our report in October 2000.

SUMMARY

Over the last 6 fiscal years, the United States provided about \$97 million in assistance to help Haiti establish its first civilian-controlled police force and improve aspects of its judicial sector, which includes various judicial institutions, procedures, and legal codes. About \$70 million in U.S. assistance helped Haiti recruit, train, organize, and equip a basic police force, including specialized units, such as an antinarcotics unit, a special investigative unit, and the Haitian Coast Guard. During the same period, the United States provided about \$27 million in assistance that led to improvements in training magistrates and prosecutors, management practices of judicial institutions, and in the access of the Haitian people to justice services. However, despite these achievements, the police force has not effectively carried out its basic law enforcement responsibilities, and recent events suggest that politicization has compromised the force, according to U.S. and other donor officials. The judicial sector also has serious weaknesses, according to U.S. and other donor officials. The sector has not undergone a major reform and, as a result, lacks independence from the executive branch and has outdated legal codes and cumbersome judicial proceedings. Further, the judicial institutions have personnel shortages; inadequate infrastructure and equipment, such as shortages of vehicles and legal texts; and an ineffective internal oversight organization unable to stem corruption. Overall, these institutions provides justice services to only a small segment of the population, because the institutions rely heavily in judicial proceedings on the use of French rather than Creole—the language of the majority of the population.

The key factor affecting the lack of success of U.S. assistance has been the Haitian government's lack of commitment to addressing the major problems of its police and judicial institutions. U.S. assistance to the police has been impeded because the Haitian government has not acted, for example, to (1) strengthen the police organization by filling currently vacant key leadership positions, such as the Inspector General; (2) provide the human and physical resources needed to develop an effective police force; (3) support vigorously police investigations of serious crimes; and (4) keep the police force out of politics. U.S. assistance to the judicial sector has been largely undercut because the Haitian government has not, for instance, (1) followed through on implementing the broad reforms needed to address its major problems, (2) assumed responsibility for adopting many of the improvements made possible by U.S. assistance, and (3) provided the physical and human resources needed to operate effectively.

BACKGROUND

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and two organizations within the Department of Justice's Criminal Division--the International Criminal Investigative and Training Assistance Program and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training--implemented the majority of assistance provided to the Haitian police and judicial sector. The Department of State has overall responsibility for coordinating this assistance. It also funds training programs implemented by U.S. law

enforcement agencies and, immediately after Haiti's return to democracy in 1994, carried out some training programs, mainly in support of the Presidential Palace Guard, which protects the Haitian President.

Several other U.S. agencies have also been involved in supporting the Haitian police. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Defense played key roles in helping to build the Haitian Coast Guard—a main component of the Haitian National Police. Also, the Drug Enforcement Administration helped to support the police's antinarcotics unit. In addition, the U.S. Customs Service helped to train Haitian customs and police officers on countersmuggling techniques.

U.S. ASSISTANCE HELPED IMPROVE THE POLICE AND JUDICIAL SECTOR, BUT MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS PERSIST

U.S. assistance to Haiti's justice sector totaled about \$97 million since fiscal year 1995, with about \$70 million going to help build a civilian-controlled police force and about \$27 million going to improve certain aspects of Haiti's judicial system, such as case registration and tracking systems. Appendix I provides a breakdown of U.S. assistance to the Haitian police and justice sectors.

U.S. Assistance Helped Build a New Haitian Police Force

U.S. assistance was intended to help Haiti create and strengthen a civilian-controlled police force that would be professional and respect the rights of the population. The assistance was used to recruit, train, organize, and equip a new police force and was administered under the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program.

The U.S. assistance helped Haiti

- recruit an interim police force of about 4,000 police officers and U.N. police monitors to work with this force;
- establish and equip a new civilian-controlled police organization and several specialized units, such as an investigative division and its antinarcotics and forensics units, the special investigative unit,² the crowd control unit, the special weapons and tactics unit,³ and the Haitian Coast Guard;
- create a police academy and recruit and train a new police force of about 6,500 police officers;
- train police officers for the specialized units;
- develop managerial and supervisory skills at all levels of the police force; and
- establish an Inspector General's office for monitoring the police force.

² This unit has focused on investigating high profile crimes, including extrajudicial killings. The U.S. assistance's long-term goal is to help integrate this unit into the mainstream judicial police.

³ The special weapons and tactics unit responds to crises in the Port-au-Prince area. This unit receives orders directly from the Director General of the police.

Other U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Customs Service, provided some assistance. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard provided over \$4.6 million to help organize, train, and equip the Haitian Coast Guard. This assistance helped Haiti establish one Coast Guard base in Port-au-Prince, refurbish three vessels, maintain equipment, and develop capabilities for dealing with drug smuggling and illegal migration, for example.

Major Weaknesses Persist in the Police Force

Despite some initial achievements made possible by U.S. assistance, the current Haitian police force has major deficiencies and is considered by many U.S. and other donor officials as a largely ineffective law enforcement body. According to these officials, the police force suffers from organizational weaknesses, shortages of personnel and training, shortages of vehicles and equipment, and limited investigative capabilities. Over the past year, particularly, U.S. and other donor officials have expressed concern over the Haitian police's crippled internal oversight organization, continued corruption, and increased signs of politicization related to recent Haitian elections.

Starting in late 1994, the United States helped Haiti organize its police force so as to have the major components of a modern civilian police organization. However, the current organization of the Haitian police is weak, according to U.S. and other donor officials. For example, several key police units are not fully operational, such as the Maritime, Air, Border, Migration, and Forest Police Directorate. Also, a few individuals manage the police organization in a highly centralized manner, delegating little authority from headquarters to the field and within the police institutions in the field. As a result, the police force in the field shows little initiative, tending to be reactive rather than actively patrolling the community. Furthermore, the police force has not yet developed a strong esprit de corps and discipline. During our visits to several police units, we saw that many lower ranking police officers did not show much respect for high-ranking officers and were milling around police facilities, reading newspapers, or watching soccer games on television.

Initially, the United States sought to help Haiti recruit and train police officers, and by 1998 the police force had reached a peak of about 6,500 officers. However, shortages of personnel plague the current police force. According to U.S. and other donor officials, the current police force is estimated to range between 3,500 and 4,500 police officers. Compared with a country like El Salvador, with 19,000 police officers serving about 6 million people, Haiti – with its approximately 8 million people – has a relatively small police force. In addition, the Haitian police has a shortage of qualified commanders and supervisors.

According to U.S. officials, there has been serious attrition in police ranks, partly as a result of the police's failure to provide professional opportunities, to implement a work schedule better than the current schedule of 12 hours a day 6 days a week, and to provide work opportunities in locations near the officers' families. U.S. officials noted that police officers have also left the force to join the growing private security industry,

which offers fewer risks and better pay and working conditions. Also, more than 1,100 police officers were dismissed from the force since 1995, as a result of the police Inspector General's investigations into police misconduct. In addition, the police's failure to recruit new officers regularly has exacerbated the attrition of the police force. Initially, the United States placed great emphasis on training the new force and setting up the police academy to continue such training. However, most of the current police force has received only basic training. For instance, police officers attend an initial 6-month training course at the academy, but they receive very little or no follow-on training unless they are assigned to a specialized unit. Although officers in the specialized units receive more training, they still have limited technical capabilities to prevent or investigate crimes. Most police officers do not get regular qualification training in firearms use, and, as a result, many officers are not qualified to use their weapons and cannot properly maintain their firearms, according to U.S. officials.

U.S. assistance helped Haiti equip its police force by supplying police vehicles, communications systems, and other equipment and supplies. However, the Haitian police force still faces severe shortages of all these items. For instance, during our visits to Saint-Marc and Jacmel, we noticed that the police stations had few vehicles, communications equipment, and other police equipment to service the large populations and territories under their jurisdictions. Moreover, U.S. officials told us that the special weapons and tactics unit could not train with its issued weapons because it did not have enough ammunition. According to U.S. officials, the effectiveness of Haitian Coast Guard is seriously constrained by its lack of bases, personnel, and equipment, particularly in the southern part of the country where the main cocaine trafficking routes are located. As a result, this unit has a limited capability to stop vessels suspected of carrying illegal cargo and emigrants.

The United States sought to help Haiti improve the investigative capabilities of its police force by providing training, technical assistance, and donations of equipment. However, the current force has made little progress in improving its investigative capabilities. For instance, U.S. officials indicated that the judicial police does not have enough trained officers to investigate crime—its primary mission—and the antinarcotics unit is too small to carry out major drug investigations. The antinarcotics unit also has limited investigative capabilities; it was until recently without a leader for months; and it consists of only 28 officers. According to an assistance agreement between the United States and Haiti, this unit was to have had about 75 officers.

Recent Problems Raise Particular Concerns About the Haitian Police

Over the past year, several problems have arisen with the Haitian police force that have raised particular concern for U.S. and other donor officials. These concerns relate to (1) the weakened position of the police Inspector General's unit, (2) the inability of the police to deal with the growing drug-trafficking threat, and (3) the signs of politicization of the police force during this past year's extended election period.

In 1995, the United States helped Haiti establish an oversight structure to monitor the conduct of its police. However, over the past year the police oversight structure has

been crippled by the unexpected departures of the Secretary of State for Public Security and the Inspector General of the police, according to U.S., Haitian, and other donor officials. These two positions are key to ensuring the internal accountability of the police force. The U.S. Department of State noted that groups reportedly associated with former President Aristide's political party mounted a public campaign calling for the resignation of the Secretary of State for Public Security. On October 7, 1999, the Secretary resigned from his position, which remains vacant, and left the country. According to U.S. officials, the Inspector General—who was conducting investigations into human rights violations, narcotrafficking, corruption, and other offenses allegedly committed by police officers—unexpectedly left the force in April 2000 and has not been permanently replaced. According to U.S. and Haitian officials, the Inspector General's investigations had led to the dismissal of over 1,100 police officers for misconduct. As reported by the Department of State, at least 58 police officers were in prison as of September 1999 on a variety of charges. The Department noted that the police more often simply discharged officers caught committing flagrant abuses, rather than initiating legal proceedings against them. Since the departure of the Inspector General, investigations of police misconduct have dramatically decreased, opening the door to increased corruption within the force, according to U.S. and Haitian officials.

The United States also helped establish the antinarcotics unit and the Haitian Coast Guard to address the growing drug trafficking problem. U.S. estimates indicate that the percentage of cocaine coming into the United States through Haiti increased from 10 to 14 percent from 1998 to 1999. However, the Haitian police has been generally ineffective in countering the growing drug threat, due to the limited capabilities and resources of its antinarcotics unit and Coast Guard. As a result, the police has conducted few major drug-related investigations successfully. Moreover, the Haitian police does not have the resources to stop airdrops of cocaine loads to waiting land vehicles or maritime vessels.

The United States sought to help Haiti establish a professional and impartial police force. However, events over the past year have raised serious concerns about the impartiality of the force. In addition to concerns over the weakened role of the police oversight structure, as noted earlier, U.S. and other donor officials have serious concerns over the partisan role played by the police during the May 2000 parliamentary and local elections. During the extended election period, for example, the police on occasion failed to protect legal demonstrations by the opposition. According to U.S. officials, the police also arrested some opposition candidates after the elections and failed to successfully investigate major killings, including political assassinations, committed before the elections.

Assistance Helped Improve Certain Aspects of the Judicial Sector

From fiscal years 1993 through 2000, the United States provided about \$27 million to support Haiti's judicial system. The aid was intended to help Haiti improve the effectiveness of existing judicial organizations and enhance the access of the population to justice. It also was intended to help Haiti develop and implement a broad reform of the judicial sector that would enhance its independence, modernize criminal codes, and restructure judicial organizations and processes.

USAID, its contractors, and the Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training provided most of this assistance under the USAID Administration of Justice Program. The bulk of the assistance, about \$23 million, funded (1) administrative enhancements for judicial institutions, such as case registration and tracking systems; (2) judge and prosecutor training; and (3) the establishment and operation of the magistrate school. The remaining assistance, \$4 million, funded legal assistance and education as a means of improving the access of the population to justice.

Serious Problems Remain in the Judicial Sector

Despite U.S. assistance, the Haitian judicial sector continues to exhibit major shortcomings. This sector has not undergone a major reform, and, as a result, it has outdated legal codes and cumbersome judicial proceedings. Also, it has inadequate infrastructure and shortages of personnel and equipment, and limited investigative capabilities. Furthermore, it suffers from corruption and a lack of effective internal oversight, and it serves only a small portion of the population.

Despite the constitutional mandate for an independent judicial sector, the executive branch, through the Ministry of Justice, continues to control the judicial sector, including the judicial budget and judicial appointments, training, evaluation, and removal. The lack of independence compromises the impartiality of the judicial sector, according to U.S., Haitian, and other donor officials. For instance, the Haitian government has not vigorously supported investigations and prosecutions of major crimes, including drug trafficking, major killings, and political violence. Investigations and prosecutions have moved slowly and produced very limited results, according to U.S. officials.

The judicial system is characterized by outdated legal codes and complex, time-consuming procedures. In criminal cases, many people are put behind bars in preventive detention. Some judicial institutions have large case backlogs, and criminal courts hold few jury trials every year.⁴ During our visits to judicial facilities in Port-au-Prince and Jacmel, judicial officials emphasized the urgent need for developing and implementing a comprehensive reform of the judicial sector to modernize legal codes and streamline judicial proceedings.

The judicial sector receives only 11.5 percent of the Ministry of Justice budget, and as a consequence, the sector has serious personnel shortages and inadequate infrastructure. For example, during our visits to judicial institutions in Port-au-Prince and Jacmel, Haitian officials emphasized that their institutions did not have enough personnel to conduct business adequately, given the size of the populations and territories they had to serve. We also found that prosecutors' offices, justice of the peace courts, and other courts had very basic infrastructure. One of the courts that we visited had no doors, windows, bathrooms, running water, or electricity. The courts also had serious supply shortages, including vehicles, legal texts, telephones, and office supplies. Haitian officials noted that the dire conditions of judicial facilities such as this one projected a bad image

⁴ Juries are convened only for serious criminal offenses, such as murders.

and did not inspire respect for their institutions, seriously undermining the people's confidence in the judicial sector.

The judicial sector also has limited capabilities to investigate and prosecute cases. Judicial officials have received little professional training; have minimum resources to conduct investigations, prosecutions, and trials; have received limited support from specialized units, such as the judicial police and forensics unit; and do not have many incentives to solve major crimes. In addition, some judicial officials stated that, because they have little personal protection, they fear for their personal safety when dealing with high-profile cases, such as drug trafficking and political assassinations.

In addition, the judicial sector suffers from corruption and lacks adequate oversight to monitor the behavior of judicial officials. For instance, U.S. officials noted that the cumbersome and lengthy judicial proceedings create opportunities for corruption among judicial officials willing to accept bribes in return for advancing cases in their offices. Also, according to these officials, the Ministry of Justice has a judicial inspection unit that has limited capabilities and has done little to address corruption and other major problems of the judicial sector. Despite efforts to enhance this unit, it remains largely ineffective, according to U.S. officials.

The judicial sector continues to provide only limited access to justice for the majority of the Haitian population. For example, by not having a public defender's office, by not systematically providing legal assistance to the population, and by conducting most of its business through written procedures in French, the judicial sector remains unavailable to the majority of the population, which is poor and illiterate and speaks only Creole.

KEY FACTOR AFFECTING SUCCESS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE IS THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHENING JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS

The primary factor affecting the success of U.S. assistance has been the Haitian government's lack of clear commitment to supporting the police and judicial sector and dealing with the main problems affecting these institutions.

The Haitian Government Lacks Strong Commitment to Strengthening the Police Force

U.S. assistance to the police has been undermined because the Haitian government--after showing a strong initial commitment to establishing a civilian-controlled police force--failed to (1) strengthen the organizational capabilities of the force, (2) support investigations of police corruption and serious crimes, and (3) keep the police out of politics, particularly during the past election year.

The Haitian government's failure to strengthen the organizational capabilities of the police has hindered U.S. efforts to improve the capabilities of the force, according to U.S. officials. Although the Haitian government has allocated the bulk of the Ministry of Justice budget to the police and prisons--about 83 percent of the 1996-97 budget--the

government has weakened the police by not filling key leadership positions, such as the Inspector General and the head of the antinarcotics unit, and by not strengthening key units. For instance, since the unexpected departure of the Inspector General, his office has stopped vigorously investigating police misbehavior, including corruption. Also, some key police units, such as the antinarcotics unit, have limited capabilities because the government has not provided needed resources and personnel. According to the Department of State, the Haitian government failed to increase the size of the antinarcotics unit, as had been agreed to by the U.S. and Haitian governments.

U.S. assistance to improve the investigative capabilities of the police has been constrained by the failure of the Haitian government to support investigations of police corruption and serious crimes, including drug-related crimes and political assassinations. In March 2000, the State Department reported that the Haitian government had failed to investigate drug-related corruption involving police officers. The State Department also reported that little progress had been made in bringing to justice persons responsible for major killings, such as political killings, in Haiti. U.S. officials are concerned about the Haitian government's lack of support for the police's special investigations unit, which is responsible for investigating major killings. This unit's human resources have declined by about 80 percent since 1997.

U.S. assistance to the Haitian police has also been undermined by the Haitian government's failure to keep the police out of politics during this past election year. The force's inaction during several violent campaign incidents and its arrests of several political candidates seriously compromised the perception of police impartiality.

Haitian Government Lacks Strong Commitment to Improving the Judicial Sector

U.S. assistance to the judicial sector has been undercut because the Haitian government, after initially supporting the assistance effort, failed to follow through in implementing broad reform of the judicial sector, adopt and institutionalize many of the improvements made possible by the assistance, provide the resources needed to operate the sector adequately, build an oversight capability to monitor the sector, and vigorously support the prosecution of major crimes.

The Haitian government did not follow through in implementing a broad reform of its legal codes and judicial organization and processes -- some of the measures that donors consider key to addressing the main problems of the judicial sector. The Haitian government has taken some steps since 1995 that may eventually lead to the implementation of a broad reform of the judicial sector. These steps include enacting judicial reform-related legislation in 1998, increasing judicial salaries, and pursuing further reform plans, such as expanding the use of Creole in judicial proceedings. However, none of these steps has moved significantly toward addressing the main shortcomings of the judicial sector.

Many improvements to the judicial sector made possible by the U.S. assistance have not been institutionalized because the Haitian government did not adopt and fund them.

Although the Haitian government assumed responsibility for most of the funding for the magistrate school that was created with U.S. and other donor support, the government did not assume ownership of the improvements, such as case registration and tracking systems, made possible by U.S. assistance in the justice of the peace courts and prosecutors' offices. As a result, according to U.S. officials, after USAID stopped its assistance to the justice of the peace courts, the improvements made by this assistance disappeared.

The Haitian government has not provided the resources needed to operate judicial institutions. During our visits to judicial institutions in Port-au-Prince, Saint-Marc, and Jacmel, we saw that the judicial institutions were overwhelmed by the lack of personnel and equipment and by their poor physical conditions.

The improvements to the judicial sector made possible by U.S. assistance have also been limited because the Haitian government has not put in place an effective oversight capability to monitor the judicial sector. The Ministry of Justice has a judicial inspection unit that has limited capabilities and physical and human resources to deal with the problems of the sector, such as judicial corruption.

The Haitian government's failure to vigorously support investigations and prosecutions of serious crimes, such as drug-related crimes and political assassinations, has hindered the improvements in the prosecutorial capabilities of the judicial sector made possible by the U.S. assistance. According to U.S., other donor, and Haitian officials, prosecutors and investigating magistrates do not have an incentive to investigate and prosecute major criminal cases and, if they do investigate, they do it with the knowledge that they are risking their personal security.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Contact and Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Virginia Hughes, Juan Tapia-Videla, David Bernet, Lee Kaukas, Richard Seldin, Steve Iannucci, Douglas Ferry, and Rona Mendelsohn.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE HAITIAN
POLICE AND JUSTICE SECTOR, FISCAL YEARS 1995-2000

Table 1 shows U.S. assistance to the Haitian police force.

Table 1: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program Assistance to the Haitian Police, Fiscal Years 1995-1999

Activity	Amount
Police training and donations of equipment	\$34,402,963
Construction of police academy	18,680,474
Program headquarters expenses	6,357,274
U.S. embassy support and program expenses	2,477,990
Staff salaries and benefits	1,838,928
Staff travel expenses	967,604
Antinarcotics training	347,029
Program audits	221,738
Total	\$65,294,000

Source: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.

Table 2 shows the overall assistance provided to Haiti's judicial system under the USAID Administration of Justice Program.

Table 2: USAID Administration of Justice Program Assistance to Haitian Judicial Sector, Fiscal Years 1993–2000

Dollars in millions

Organization and activity	Amount
USAID	\$5.4
Direct aid to Ministry of Justice	2.4
Other technical and equipment assistance	0.8
USAID management	2.0
Audit of Checchi	0.2
RONCO Consulting Corporation Interim Administration of Justice Program	2.8
Checchi & Company Consultants, Inc.	11.5
Legal assistance and education	4.0
Case registration and court management	3.2
Judicial mentoring	1.8
Other technical and equipment assistance	2.5
Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training	7.0
Magistrate school	2.1
Case tracking system	0.5
Model jurisdiction program and related assistance	4.4
Total	\$26.7

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.

USAID provided \$2.4 million in direct aid and \$0.8 million in technical and equipment assistance to the Haitian Ministry of Justice in fiscal years 1993-2000 and incurred \$2.2 million in management costs for its Administration of Justice Program.

RONCO provided \$2.8 million in aid from June 1995 to July 1996. This contractor

primarily focused on refurbishing, equipping, and providing administrative and logistical support to the magistrate school established in 1995.

Checchi provided \$11.5 million in assistance August 1995 to August 1999. Under its contract with USAID, Checchi focused its efforts on three activities: legal assistance and education, case tracking and court management, and judicial mentoring.

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